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FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW TO WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
WHO STUDIES WKAT, HOW? WHY*
Frederick S. Tipson
I am not here with a system . , of
social or legal or political philo-
sophy wherewith to regenerate Inter-
national Law. Indeed, I doubt if we
may expect one to spring into existence
at once . . . . But it is something to
recognize the task that is before us, to
perceive the inadequacy of the theories
and methods of the last century, and
wherein and why they are inadequate, and
to ask ourselves what are likely to be
the elements of a new theory of Inter-
national Law and whence a more adequate
International Law is to derive its
materials. ROSCOE 
POUND1
The study of international law, like all juris-
prudence, necessarily proceeds on the basis of a
broad set of assumptions about purpose, scope, methods,
and standards of performance. Yet these assumptions,
and the difficult issues behind them, are seldom discussed
by those concerned with international law. It is
* This article is adapted from the first chapter of a disser-
tation entitled "Consolidating World Public Order: The Ameri-
can Study of International Law and the Work of Harold D, Lass-
well and Myres S. McDougal, 1906-1976" (University of Virginia, 1977).
** Associate Director, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, and
Lecturer in Law, University of Virginia. On leave during 1978-79 as
an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.
1. Pound, The Part of Philosophy in International Law, in
PROC. SIXTH INT'L CONG. PHIL. 372, 378 (E. Brightman ed. 1927).
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therefore useful to inquire whether the assumptions
that govern international legal studies are adequate
under present circumstances. Are we somehow condemned
simply to repeat or rearrange the ideas of our pre-
decessors, or is it possible to "progress" beyond
them, to "distill" the best thinking of earlier per-
iods and to adapt and improve upon it in confronting
the problems of our own times? If so, by what pro-
cess is such development accomplished? According to
what standards should we proceed?
In a journal of international law founded in the
Yale Law School it is appropriate to ask whether and
how the work of Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and
their co-workers -- often referred to as the "Yale
School of International Law" -- complements the ideas
of their predecessors. Does their "policy-oriented
approach" provide, as Pound put it, "the elements of
a new theory of International Law"? Much of the
criticism of the Lasswell-McDougal approach derives
from misunderstanding of its purposes and of the way
its distinctive form develops from and advances those
purposes. The perspective of this article may help
to clarify the nature of their contribution. This
perspective has to do less with the substantive answers
that their approach has given to basic issues of juris-
prudence than with the way in which the issues them-
selves have been framed. To recognize the significance
of this contribution, consideration should first be
given to the legacy of theoretical and methodological
confusion to which Lasswell and McDougal are responding.
I. CONFUSION OVER FUNDAMENTALS:
THE UNCERTAIN HERITAGE
A. Pre-World War I: A Flight from Theorizing
Early American writers on international law were
often outspoken in their criticism of the imprecision
and lack of agreement in international legal studies
about basic concepts and premises. Chancellor Kent,
for example, in his lectures of 1823 on international
law, complained that:
[Tihe want of a clear and precise
definition of its precepts, and a
recognized authoritative classifi-
cation of its various parts, are
serious lets and hindrances to a
proper appreciation of it as a
science.... [The student of in-
ternational law] finds ... to his
surprise, that the very sphere and
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scope, the foundation, the
elements, and the evidence of
the science are disputed points,
and that in these preliminaries
the highest authorities differ.
2
Nearly a century later John Chipman Gray could still
suggest that "on no subject of human interest, ex-
cept theology, has there been so much loose writing
and nebulous speculation as on international law. 13
While much attention was given in the literature to
the substantive rules of international law, theoret,
ical support for the idea that such rules "bound"
nation-states was seldom offered by American writers.
Likewise, methodology--the study of various
techniques of inquiry and of the reasons for choosing
some methods over others--until recently has not
been a major concern of international lawyers in
this country. Interest in methodology was particu-
larly lacking before World War I, the formative period
of American international law. For example, during
the early years of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, from 1906 until after the War, its Journal
and Proceedings were virtually devoid of general dis-
cussions about the scope and purpose of the discipline,
the major functions to be performed by those writers
associated with it, the procedures to be followed in
research, or the theoretial basis for widely-used
concepts and terminology.
Even the First World War, despite its impqct on
the substance of certain branches of international law,5
did little to change the basic methods by which they
were studied. The general presumption continued to he that
2. KENT'8 COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (J. Abdy
ed. 1866).
3. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 122 (1909).
4. One important exception to this generalization was:
an essay written by ?. European jurist. The essay, however,
seems to have generated little subsequent comment. See Oppen-
hem, The Science of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 310
(1908). See also L. OPPENHEIM, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ch. 4 (1921).
5. See 1 & 2 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD
WAR (1920).
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international legal studies were primarily for
determining and expounding "the body of rules ac-
cepted by the general community of nations as
defining their rights and the means of procedure
by which those rights may be protected or viola-
tions of them redressed."6 These were the words of
Professor Charles G. Fenwick in a widely-used text
on the subject. Fenwick acknowledged a separate
study of "the underlying conceptions of interna-
tional law" which he called "international juris-
prudence," but he did not suggest how that study
should be organized or how it was related to the
"science of international law"--the explicit focus
of his own treatise.?
It was customary in this early period to point
to Hugo Grotius as the founder of a modern
"science" of international law.8 While there was
truth in that notion, since Grotius and his suc-
cessors had established a jurisprudential stan-
dard that strongly influenced most subsequent
writing, it is also likely that few international
lawyers in this country carefully assessed the
adequacy and relevance of Grotius' approach. An
exception was John Bassett Moore, who noted that
the prestige of Grotius was often exaggerated:
6. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1924).
7. Id.
8. Deference to Grotius was common among international
lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic. See, e.g., T. WALKER,
THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1893):
A Science of International Law of today must
be a science of Territorial Sovereignty . ...
It was this science which the Peace of Westphalia
made realisable; and it was this science that
Grotius expounded.
Grotius' major work was of course his DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS
(1625). The significance of the work of Grotius has been
assessed in A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS (1947); W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL CONMUNITY OF MANKIND
(1954); C. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, THE THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1919). See also notes 60-95 infra.
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The popular supposition that inter-
national law, as we now have it, ori-
ginated with Grotius...is due to the
circumstances that his treatise was
exceptionally clear, comprehensive and
systematic, and for that reason formed
a landmark in the development of the
science; but if one will take the
trouble, as few now do, to examine the
pages of Grotius, it will be found not
only that he drew his inspiration and
his opinions largely from earlier times
and writers, but also that some of his
fundamental doctrines are now obsolete. 9
Rather than engage in such reexamination, how-
ever, most American students of international law
accepted their inheritance largely at face value,
even where it departed drastically from Grotius.
They preferred instead the exercise of identifying,
classifying, interpreting, and applying the rules
themselves. In this they shared the inclinations
of their British counterparts, but diverged sharply
from the jurists of Continental Europe.1 0 Unlike
the latter, who retained close academic ties to
philosophy, Anglo-American legal study had become
9. Moore, Law and Organization, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1
(1915) (presidential address to the American Political Science
Association).
As Grotius himself wrote,
The undertaking seemed to me all the more worth
while because, as I have said, no one has dealt
with the subject-matter as a whole, and those
who have treated portions of it have done so in
a way to leave much to the labors of others....
[M]ost of them have done their work without sys-
tem...
H. GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (F. Kelsey trans. 1925),
in the Prolegomena, at 22.
10. According to Nussbaum,
The divergence between the Anglo-American and
the continental school of international law
did not vanish during the period [1900-1937];
in its first decades it was perhaps more
accentuated than in the nineteenth century.
A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 8, at 276.
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"professionalized" in a way that discouraged theoret-
ical speculation and methodology.ll By the early
twentieth century, legal study in the United States
was dominated'by the law schools, in whose hands the
emphasis on professional practice institutionalized
a conception of legal education that had little
place for broader theorizing.1 2
B. Competing Calls to Consensus. Kelsen vs. Pound
During the interwar period two major approaches
to revising the theoretical foundations of interna-
tional law emerged. One was based upon the "Vienna
School" of jurisprudence associated with the great
11. The natural law philosophy of Grotius retained a
much stronger hold upon Continental scholarship. As Roscoe
Pound observed,
A just feeling that international law could
not rest securely upon such a basis was be-
hind English and American distrust of Con-
tinental speculative international law.
English and Americans were right in demand-
ing a better theory of international legal
obligation. But they were wrong in believ-
ing that they could find it without the aid
of philosophy. On the whole the Continental
speculative writers were nearer the truth.
Their error was in relying upon a philosophi-
cal system, the philosophy of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, rather than upon
philosophy.
Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, 1 BIBLIO-
THECA VISSERIANA 73, 83-84 (1923).
12. See Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An
Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968), reprinted
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 331, 352 (H. Packer &
T. Ehrlich eds. 1972).
A certain degree of theoretical attention was directed
towards the concepts of sovereignty and equality in the after-
math of the First World War. But this speculation was largely
of an abstract and traditional sort. See, e.g., E. DICKINSON,
THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920); Borchard,
Political Theory and International Law, in A HISTORY OF POLI-
TICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES 120 (C. Merriam & H. Barnes eds.
1924).
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Austrian scholar, Hans Kelsen.1 3 Kelsen's "pure
theory of law" presented international law as a for-
mal system of norms rigorously distinguished from
social and political influences. He sought a
"science" of law which would preserve the "essential,"
juristic qualities of international law, and cri-
ticized those who imported "po itical" considerations
into assessments of legality.1 4 As one commentator
has written of Kelsen: "[O]ne of his main objectives
has consistently been to defend the 'purity' of the
Pure Theory of Law against two areas of methodologi-
cal syncretism into which legal analysis has often
been drawn: psychology and sociology on the one
hand and ethics and politics on the other."15
Kelsen's influence was originally less significant in
this country than in Europe, but his own immigration
to the United States, and that of several of his best
students, eventually led to an important following
here.1 6  Even the leader of the other major stream of
jurisprudential revision, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard,
13. See Kunz, The Vienna School and International Law,
11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 370 (1934).
14. It is called a "pure" theory of law, because
it only describes the law and attempts to
eliminate from the object of this descrip-
tion everything that is not strictly law.
Its aim is to free the science of law from
alien elements. This is the methodological
basis of the theory.
H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 1 (M. Knight trans. 1967).
See also H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966).
15. Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing
Legal Thought, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 650 (1971). Professor
Leo Gross emphasized the difference between Kelsen and the
policy-oriented approach:
Nothing could have been more abhorrent to him
than the policy-science approach to inter-
national law which disguises policy in a
pseudoscientific apparatus of procedures for
determining what the law is.
Gross, Hans Kelsen, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 491, 499 (1973).
16. Gross, supra note 15, passim.
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called Kelsen "unquestionably the leading jurist of
the time."lY
Nevertheless, Pound's efforts were precisely
in the direction opposed so vigorously by Kelsen
and the positivists of the Vienna School. In a lec-
ture at the University of Leyden in 1922, Pound called
for
a legal philosophy that shall take
account of the social psychology,
the economics, the sociology as well
as the law and politics of today,
that shall enable international law
to take in what it requires from
without, that shall give us a func-
tional critique of international law
in terms of social ends, not an
analytical critique in terms of it-
self, and above all that shall con-
ceive of the legal order as a pro-
cess and not as a condition,18
The "instrumentalist thinking" then popular in social
science suggested to him a theory of international
law that recognized the "great task of social engineer-
ing . . • whereby the conflicting or overlapping in-
terests and claims and demands of the peoples of this
crowded world may be secured or satisfied so far as
may be with a minimum of friction and a minimum of
waste."19
Drawing upon the example of Grotius' jurispru-
dential breakthrough in the seventeenth century, Pound
challenged international lawyers to develop
a creative, philosophical juristic
thought, analogous to that of Grotius
and his school in that it would apply
creative philosophical ideas to set
up a picture of what we may do and
should do and would invite creative
17. Pound, Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories,
43 YALE L.J. 525, 532.(1934).
18. Pound, supra note 11, at 89. Pound's conception of
a "sociological" jurisprudence had previously been set forth in
American journals.
19. Pound, supra note 11, at 89.
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juristic effort to shape existing
legal institutions and to make new
ones in that image. 2 0
He was hardly alone in perceiving the gap between
political needs and theoretical clarity. At the 1925
Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related*
Subjects, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation,21
Manley 0. Hudson echoed Pound's assessment of the prob-
lem: "Isn't it obvious that we are in need of a re-
statement of the basic conceptions of our international
law...? We need to have done for the twentieth cen-
tury the kind of job which Grotius did for the seven-
teenth century. ,22
20. Id. at 75. See also Pound, Grotius in the Science
of Law, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 685 (1925); Pound, The Part of Philoso-
phy in International Law, in PROC. SIXTH INT'L CONG. PHIL. 372
(E. Brightman ed. 1927); Pound, Toward a New Jus Gentium, in
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 1 (F. Northrop ed. 1949).
21. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
sponsored seven conferences of this kind, usually in conjunction
with the annual meeting of the American Society of International
Law, in 1914, 1925, 1928, 1929, 1933, 1938, and 1941. The
proceedings are a valuable source of information on the changing
nature of the discipline in the United States.
22. Hudson, Contemporary Development of International Law,
in SECOND CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TEACHERS 83, 88 (1925), See
also Hudson, The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth
Century, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 419 (1924). At the same conference
Professor Charles G. Fenwick offered a similar diagnosis:
So our theories of international law are a
most unsatisfactory combination of ideas
borrowed from the natural law, which certainly
had a place in their day, and, on the other
hand, ideas representing the hard facts of
international practice divorced from any
critical attitude toward the justice or in-
justice of the facts.
Now, how shall we meet this situation? It
seems to me highly desirable that we who are
interested in the science of the subject should
undertake a very careful study of the underlying
principles of international law.
Fenwick, The Reexamination and Restatement of the Fundamental
Theories of International Law as a Means to More Effective Ex-
position as well as to Improvements in System and Content, in id,
at 65, 67.
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But no such Grotius was soon to appear. In the
same forum three years later, a panel examining the
feasibility of a "functional approach" to international
law saw little indication that a methodological
revolution was imminent. 2 3 Philip C. Jessup offered
some valuable observations on the resistance among
his colleagues to such innovations:
Perhaps in international law the em-
ployment of the functional method
faces obstacles greater than those
which confront its utilization in
private law. Against a scoffing and
cynical lay world, the international
lawyer has been intent upon empha-
sizing that rules of international
law exist and are observed. If he
succeeds in demonstrating that the
international society is not lawless
and that breaches of the law have
not rendered it non-existent, he may
be inclined to rest triumphant. The
analysis of the rules against the
actual background of the interna-
tional society in all its phases may
seem to offer a task of staggering
proportions. 24
In 1930, Quincy Wright found some indications
that international lawyers were increasingly making
use of the social sciences in their work.2 5 He
credited Pound with creating a renewed sensitivity
in the profession to the importance of "juristic
analyses built on the findings of most of the social
sciences," but suggested that the greater part of
this research was in the nature of reference rather
than integration.2 6 Wright insisted that interna-
tional law should "relate itself [to the social
sciences] not merely by using their data, but also
23. THIRD CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TEACHERS
125 (1928).
24. Jessup, The Functional Approach As Applied to
International Law, in id. at 134, 136-37.
25. Q. WRIGHT, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE
THE WAR 29 (1930).
26. Id. at 29-31.
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by employing their methods and philosophy,"'2 7 and
he concluded his survey with a strong plea for
deeper inquiry into the theoretical foundations of
the discipline.28
In the 1930's Pound's "sociological juris-
prudence" was taken a step further by a group of
law professors associated with the "legal xealist"
movement. 2 9 While this term was used to encompass a
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 36. The jurist, he wrote,
* , . should seek constantly to foxmulate the
concepts and conclusions based on concrete
evidence into larger concepts and systems.
The law cannot live on philosophy alone, but
it cannot live without philosophy. By en-
visaging the broadest tendencies of the
times and moulding his systems toward them,
the jurist may gradually shape the course
of society itself.
Wright's sentiments were echoed by other American interna-
tional lawyers from time to time, for example, by Edwin
Dickinson:
The student or practitioner whose
interest is primarily in the inter-
pretation and application of the law
of nations is often prone to dismiss
fundamental concepts as a matter of
mere theoretical importance. This is
a serious mistake.... Concepts, in
truth, are as much a part of the fabric
of international jurisprudence as the
intricate and confused records of inter-
national conduct. If they are no longer
its warp and woof, they provide at least
the necessary patterns.
Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation,
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932).
29. Excellent studies of the legal realist movement
include W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); K. TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); Currie, The
Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEG. ED. 331, 341 (1951). For
a discussion of the differences between realism and Pound's
sociological jurisprudence, see White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
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large variety of viewpoints, the legal realists gen-
erally had in common a critical view of the American
legal system, emphasizing the irrationality, ineffi-
ciency, or injustice of its operation. Most of them
followed Pound's lead in looking to the social sciences
for the methods and theories to reform legal educa-
tion and the legal system.3 0 Pound's own criticism
of these realists was largely the result of what he
perceived to be their excessive cynicism and mis-
guided criticism of legal rules. 31
In spite of all the furor created by legal
realists in the discussion of domestic legal issues,
the realists made little impression upon in-
ternational law. 3 2 The one important exception was
30. See, e.g., Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1931); Arnold, Institute Priests
and Yale Observers--A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L, REV.
811 (1936).
31. Compare Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,
44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931), with Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (reply to article by Pound).
32. McDougal assessed the contribution of the legal
realists in his 1975 address to the American Branch of the
International Law Association:
At one time I thought that the American
realists had not contributed very much.
There's only one book written from this
guise published in St. Louis called The
Lawless Law of Nations, by a man named
Edmunds. It seemed to be very bad. Fred-
erick Dunn's book on The Protection of
Nationals comes a little closer and of
course is a great book.
But as I reflected this morning I think
American legal realism has had much greater
impact on international law than is repre-
sented in any book. This is the notion
of decision and of decision-making--the
notion that completely dominates the think-
ing by political scientists today and is
gradually seeping into law schools and in-
ternational law writing and discussion.
McDougal, Reflections on American Perspectives on International
Law, in CONDYNE LAW TAPES INL-1005 (1976).
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a lawyer-turned-political scientist named Frederick
Sherwood Dunn. Dunn's classic study in 1932 cri-
ticized traditional assumptions about international
law in the general mold of Pound and the legal
realists. 3 3 Having begun his career as a legal
officer in the Department of State, and later com-
ing in contact with several of the principal legal
realists at Johns Hopkins University, Dunn was
skeptical of the rules of international law and
their manipulation by government officials.34 He
33. F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1932). But see the
review by Borchard in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 188 (1934). See also
Dunn, International Legislation, 42 POL. SCI. Q. 571 (1927);
Dunn, International Law and Private Property Rights, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1928).
Much of what is here said will not be new
to those who are familiar with current
trends of thought in the field of municipal
law and its related social sciences. The
author is fully sensible of the great debt
he owes to the stimulating and adventurous
thinkers who are remaking those fields, es-
pecially to such writers and jurists as
Cook, Holmes, Stone, Cardozo, Pound, Oliphant,
Yntema, Llewellyn, John Dickinson, Green,
Underhill Moore, Michael, Arnold, Frank-
furter and Powell; and to such philosophers
as Dewey, Morris Cohen, Felix Cohen, Cassius
Keyser, C.I. Lewis, Whitehead and Adler.
What is new, perhaps, is the effort to apply
to international problems some of the ideas
germinating in other fields. Such an enter-
prise obviously cannot be-accomplished in
one work or by one person; it requires the
help of many minds and many viewpoints.
F. DUNN, supra, at 10-11.
34. For an account of Dunn's career, see Fox,
Frederick Sherwood Dunn and the American Study of Interna-
tional Relations, 15 WORLD POL. 1 (1962), reprinted in W, FOX,
THE AMERICAN STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 36 (1967).
Dunn was influenced at Johns Hopkins especially by
Walter Wheeler Cook, a "legal realist," who had left Yale in
1928 to set up the short-lived Institute of Law. See Cook, The
Legal Method, in FIFTH CONF. INT'L L. TEACHERS 50 (1933).
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sought to restructure the study of international law
to suggest the wide range of considerations that
entered into decisions ostensibly "legal" in na-
ture.35
Dunn's work reflected the same impatience with
outdated philosophical assumptions that had moti-
vated Pound's earlier critique of international legal
studies. "[Both the political scientist and the
jurist," wrote Dunn in 1927, "tend to endow the estab-
lished postulates of their sciences with a rigidity
and longevity that does not accord with the changing
character of human institutions."36 Like Pound, Dunn
looked for a transformation of the discipline based
upon the newest inter-disciplinary developments:
[Tihe present range of our experience
seems no longer capable of being satis-
factorily explained within the framework
of conventional ways of thinking about
the subject. When this happens there
is only one thing to do, and that is to
35. See F. DUNN, supra note 33, at 196. Dunn's ideas
bear great resemblance to some of the later arguments of McDougal.
McDougal knew Dunn well during the latter's tenure as Director
of the Yale Institute of International Studies from 1943 to 1948.
36. Dunn, supra note 35, at 571.
This tendency is particularly apparent
in such an abstract branch of the jur-
istic science as that of international
jurisprudence, where the vastness of
the field of action and the novelty of
the subject matter make the construction
of a scientific system so enormously dif-
ficult a task. Most of the doctrines we
possess in this field have come down to
us from the infancy of the science, and
their tenacity in the face of the rapidly
changing character of the international
community in the last century has brought
about an extraordinary divergence between
accepted theory and current practice.
[VOL. 4
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push our inquiry back to the impli-
cit assumptions underlying the
established system of thought under-
lying the established system of
thought on the subject, to bring these
out into the light, to question their
validity however "self-evident" they
may seem, and to see if we cannot
find alternative hypotheses which
more adequately account for the whole
range of our present knowledge or
experience.37
But Dunn, like Pound before him, never carried
through this effort.3 8
C. Post-World War II: More of the Same?
In the wake of World War II, international
lawyers turned once again to the task of rebuilding
their discipline; but the emphasis was still
on substantive principles of law rather than funda-
mental reform of legal theory. Philip Jessup, for
example, in 1946 called for revisions of international
law to give increased recognition to individuals and
less to absolute state sovereignty. 39 Though he
endorsed in passing Dunn's arguments regarding the
need for a "challenge of underlying assumptions in
international law and relations," Jessup was more
37. T. DUNN, supra note 33, at 8.
38. Dunn did begin a brief, but largely unfruitful effort
to explore the central problems of international relations in
terms of the basic dilemma of "peaceful change"-- an attempt
which faded with the outbreak of World War II. F. DUNN,
PEACEFUL CHANGE: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES (1937);
Dunn, Law and Peaceful Change, 1944 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 60.
See also E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 ch. 13
(1939); Lauterpacht, The Legal Aspect, in PEACEFUL CHANGE: AN
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 135 (C. Manning ed. 1937). Dunn's later
writings were even less "policy-oriented". Dunn, The Scope of
International Relations, 1 WORLD POL. 144 (1948); Dunn, The
Present Course of International Relations Research, 2 WORLD POL,
81 (1949).
In 1939, Pound was still repeating his original call for
a "thorough study of fundamentals" and for renewed attention
to the philosophy of international law. Pound, The Idea of Law
in International Relations, 1939 PROCS. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 10, 21-22
39. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1946).
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concerned with political than with jurisprudential
assumptions.40 He endorsed a change in the interna-
tional legal system, but failed to relate that change
to the ways in which the system itself was conceived.
Writing in the same year, another international
lawyer criticized what he saw as
mechanistic adherence to traditional
ill-digested generalities and slogans
devised by theoreticians of an un-
scientific age of subsidized piracy,
matchlocks, woodfires and candlelight,
wide-open spaces, and glorification of
cruel aggressive forces for selfish
profit--theoreticians who could have
foreseen little of the technology,
industries, social pressures, and
dominant impulses of our crowded, com-
plex, modern civilization.41
And six years later, Covey T. Oliver called it
"regrettableft
that those with professional competence
in international law and in philo-
sophy of law generally, continue (a)
seemingly at loggerheads about basic
concepts, (b) quixotically optimistic
or just plain arrogant about law's
place in the whole picture, and (c)
wedded to media ill-adapted for any
effective communication with the main
bodies of citizenry or.. .with other
professional groups working in the
same fields.42
40, 1d, at 4.
41. Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Marginal
Belt, 40 AM4. J. INT'L L. 173 (1946),
42. Oliver, Reflections on Two Recent Developments
Affecting the Function of Law in the International Conunity,
30 TEXAS L. REV. 815, 841 (1952). Charles de Visscher referred
to international law in the early 1950's as "a field which
methodological prejudices have been largely responsible for
leaving fallow." C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (P. Corbett trans. 1968).
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In 1953 lMyres S. McDougal once again revived
Roscoe Pound's challenge to international lawyers
to look to the social sciences for a new strategy of
inquiry.43 In collaboration with Harold D, Lasswell,
McDougal argued for the reconstruction of inter-
national law as a "policy science":
KL]egal scholars will require a
comprehensive guiding theory and
intellectual techniques adequate to
perform certain specific functions
[that form] the elements of
a "policy-oriented" approach to the
study of law-.44
The Lasswell-McDougal "policy orientation" was
firmly within the tradition of sociological juris-
prudence and its legal-realist variant. 4 5 It is no
coincidence that McDougal led off his 1953 lectures
at the Hague Academy of International Law with a key
quotation from Pound's famous lecture at a neighbor-
ing Dutch university a generation earlier, 4 6 McDougal
43. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy:
A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECEUIL DES COURS 137 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McDougal, International Law, Power and
Policy]. This was the first and still one of the best descrip-
tions of the policy-oriented approach to international law.
It summarized several years of postwar collaboration with
Lasswell. For earlier indications of his position, see McDougal,
The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy
Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1349 (1947);
McDougal, The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 MISS. L.J, 253
(1948); McDougal, Remarks, in 1947 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L, 47,
44. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy,
supra note 43, at 140.
45. See Note, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise; Toward
a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 VA, J. INT'L L. 535
(1974).
46, That quotation was from Pound's concluding para-
graphs:
We shall not ask . . Ithe jurist of the
immediate future] for a juristic romance
built upon the cosmological romance of some
closed metaphysical system. But we may
demand of him a legal philosophy that shall
take account of the social psychology, the
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proceeded to elaborate a functional approach to inter-
national law directly responsive to Pound's challenge.47
At the same time, the approach had even deeper roots
in the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism
which made the work of Lasswell and McDougal more
than a simple translation of legal realism to the
international sphere. 8
However, the initial response of others to
McDougal's challenge was the same ambiguous
reaction that had greeted Pound's similar prescriptions
of 1922. Occasionally endorsed in principle, McDougal's
proposal apparently continued to represent to most in-
ternational lawyers what Jessup had called in 1928 "a
task of staggering proportions.,,49 The scope of McDou-
gal's proposed reforms and the extensive effort obviously
required to perform each of the intellectual operations
he deemed "indispensable" were so imposing that many
easily evaded them.
Other factors certainly reinforced this pro-
crastination. On the one hand, despite a general
economics, the sociology as well as the
law and politics of today, that shall
enable international law to take in what
it requires from without, that shall give
us a functional critique of international
law in terms of social ends, not an
analytical critique in terms of itself,
and above all that shall conceive of the
legal order as a process and not as a
condition.
Pound, supra note 11, at 89.
47. Our principal concern in these lectures
has been ... with adapting the sound core
of traditional international jurisprudence
to the systematic assessment of findings
and guidance of appropriate inquiries in
other contributory fields.
McDougal, The Role of Law in World Politics, supra note 43, at
257-58. C. Wilfred Jenks has noted the important influence of
Pound on McDougal. W. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? A STUDY OF
THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1969).
48. See Note, supra note 45.
49. Jessup, p. 48 supra.
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receptiveness to the use of social science as a
source of information, or even as a thought-provoking
professional device, international lawyers would not
easily surrender to the idea that their subject should
be studied in the manner of a social science. They
were understandably suspicious of the jargon and
strange style of presentation that challenged their
own as a language of professional communication.50
On the other hand, political scientists were
becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the entire
notion of international "law". In the 1950's, poli-
tical science was dominated by "realists" like Hans
Morgenthau who argued that international relations
was fundamentally a struggle for power and that
international law was of marginal significance, if
not a complete illusion.51 Concurrently, the ranks
of an older generation of political scientists who
had specialized in international law were not rein-
forced by younger scholars of comparable interests
and stature. Thus Quincy Wright in 1955 concluded
that: "The discipline of international law is in a
state of crisis. As understood by traditionalists
it appears to be obsolete, and as understood by
modernists it appears to be premature." 52
The 1960's did not witness a meaningful resolu-
tion of this "crisis". The decade began with a pro-
mising variety of new approaches, including systems
theory, historical sociology, organization theory,
50. Many practitioners, however, had grown impatient
with traditional formulations:
[D]iscussion of International Law, un-
affected by the trend of recent legal
writing in other fields, has persisted
in its preoccupation with high level
abstractions. It is time that attempts
were made to bridge the gap between the
realities of practice and the arid
legalisms of the literature.
Coudert & Lans, Direct Foreign Investment in Undeveloped
Countries: Some Practical Problems, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
741, 742 (1946), quoted in P. JESSUP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3-4 (1959).
51. See K. THOMPSON, POLITICAL REALISM AND THE CRISIS
OF WORLD POLITICS: AN AMERICAN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY (1960).
52. Q. WRIGHT, THE STUDY OF INTERNATONAL RELATIONS 233
(1955).
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functionalism, and policy science,5 3 But it closed
with the same general eclecticism and atomization,
International lawyers continued to differ widely in
their attitudes toward the essential nature and basic
methods of their discipline, as evidenced by the
confused debates on such issues as Vietnam, treaty
interpretation, and national expropriation.
Political science, on the other hand, had
become the province of a new breed of self-conscious-
ly scientific "behavioralists" for whom international
law was something of an embarrassment.54 To poli-
tical scientists, international law seemed to lack
the precision and the concreteness of other areas of
inquiry.
In short, the study of international law has
continued without a broad consensus on fundamental
theoretical and methodological issues, save that
inherited from the traditional but increasingly dis-
credited nineteenth century viewpoint. Despite
greater attention shown to these issues in recent
years, 5 5 the possibility for consolidation of an
approach along the lines of Pound's original sugges-
tion seems remote. As one recent study concluded:
"[W]e are faced with the paradox that the more neces-
sary general theory seems to be and the more intense
the striving for it, the more difficult it is to
53. See, e.g., K. CARLSTON, LAW AND ORGANIZATION IN
WORLD SOCIETY (1962); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1963); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); Hoffmann, The Study of
International Law and the Theory of International Relations,
1963 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 26.
54. See CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(K. Knorr & J. Rosenau eds. 1969); CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 13 (J. Dougherty & R. Pfaltzgraff eds.
1971). But see M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN
PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1968); W. COPLIN,
THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966).
55. See, for example, the writings of Richard A. Falk,
Tom J. Farer, W. Michael Reisman, Rosalyn Higgins, John Norton
Moore, Richard B. Lillich, Burns Weston, and Anthony D'Amato,
See also Piscatori, The Contribution of International Law to
International Relations, 53 INT'L AFF. 217 (1977).
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attain.115
6
II. IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS:
BACK TO THE BASICS
A. Falk's "Scientific Revolution"
Perhaps the most ambitious recent effort to
deal with issues of consensus in international law
was Richard A. Falk's Sherrill Lectures at the Yale
Law School in 1974. Falk drew interesting parallels
between the history of natural science, as inter-
preted by Thomas S. Kuhn and the history of inter-
national legal studies.5 He argued that interna-
tional lawyers, and indeed students of international
relations in general, share the same kind of "para-
digm," or set of "shared assumptions, traditions,
and procedures," as those which guide inquiry in
the natural sciences.5 8 Furthermore, the impact of
this common intellectual perspective on all thinking
in international law was similar to that of the basic
sciences:
56. W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 18 (1970).
The search or, at least, the felt need for
general theory with categories into which
to deposit new information, to store it,
and from which to retrieve it.. .remains.
Discomfiture induced by confrontation
with the mass of data observed and now
generated as well neither completely drives
out the patterns of thought acquired
from what once passed for general theory
nor prevents search at a less ambitious
level of analysis for partial theory as
a step, taken in hope, toward eventual
general theory.
Id. at 17.
57. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (1970); Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal
Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975).
58. Falk, supra note 57, at 977.
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Such a paradigm sets boundaries on
research and creates a set of intel-
lectual taboos that prevail until
challenged by new discoveries, so-
called anomalies, that are not expli-
cable within the reigning paradigm and
yet appear too significant to ignore
or disavow. It is at such a point that
a scientific revolution occurs and a
new paradigm is crystallized, in order
to allow the work of the profession to
proceed with maximum efficiency because
a large fundamental area of agreement
can again be taken for granted.59
Though Falk acknowledged that Kuhn himself "has
been properly critical of facile extrapolations of
his ideas about paradigms in the ngtural sciences to
the discipline of social science." 0 Falk remained
interested in developing a dominant paradigm "that
confines inquiry and embodies a consensus as to the
political terrain upon which international law can
fruitfully operate". 61 Falk's recent work is based
upon the assumption that, at the present time, in-
ternational lawyers need to fashion "a new juridical
expression which corresponds to the political reali-
ties that are moving the world system from one of
relatively decentralized, if hierarchically arranged,
59. Id. at 976.
60. Id. Indeed, it was a perception of the differences
between "natural" and "social" sciences that originally led
Kuhn to his thesis about the nature and function of paradigms
in the former. T. KUHN, supra note 57, at viii. Kuhn writes
that, "[t]hough scientific development may resemble that
in other fields more closely than has often been supposed, it
is also strikingly different." Id. at 209. Kuhn does, how-
ever, "underscorle] the need for similar and, above all, for
comparative study of the corresponding communities in other
fields." Id. For extensive commentary and criticism of Kuhn's
original essay, see 4 CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE
(I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970).
61. Falk, supra note 57, at 977,
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statism to relatively centralized, but not yet pre-
determined, rearrangements of managerial control
and value priorities."6 2 He finds this necessary
effort inhibited by the prevailing assumption that
international law is a system of rules operating ex-
clusively upon nation-states:
The statist paradigm has been used
by the profession to discipline de-
viant practitioners, mainly by
labelling them as "utopian," "lega-
list," or "idealist," that is, un-
worthy of serious attention because
they worked outside the paradigm, or
more likely, challenged the prevail-
ing paradigm of geopolitically con-
ditioned interstate relations.6 3
Thus Falk sees the need for what he calls a
"paradigm shift" or "paradigm redesign" (Kuhn's
"scientific revolution") in the study of interna-
tional law. 64 It is in this context that he interprets
the significance of Lasswell, McDougal,
"and their numerous co-workers." Falk suggests that
their writings amount to the kind of "dangerous know-
ledge" that threatens the prevailing "statist para-
digm" by providing "a radical [world order] vision
of prime magnitude." 6 5 It is radical because it
implies a complete "redefinition of what constitutes
knowledge for lawyers": 6 6
It is universal in scope: that is,
the conception is nonhierarchical,
and does not necessarily depend on
the persistence of the state system.
It is process-oriented in relation to
the future: that is, it suggests we
create the future by promoting pre-
ferred values in all critical arenas,
62. Id. at 976. See also 9, FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE
WORLDS (1975).
63. Falk, supra note 57, at 977,
64. Id. at 992, 994.
65. Id. at 1009.
66. Id. at 1011 n.106,
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starting now. It is oriented toward
the well-being of the species as a
whole, and is thus naturally recep-
tive to both an ecological perspec-
tive and a futurist concern with
assuring the life-chances of subse-
quent generations. 67
Falk's praise of the Lasswell-McDougal approach
is qualified only by his belief that their work is
"1not yet related directly enough to the transitional
historical situation that is already underway.",6 8 He
suggests that it needs to be "developed in several
directions" 69 and "refocus[ed] . . . on the specific
challenges posed by a transitional context." 70 Thus
Falk is not certain "whether the McDougal jurispru-
dence will underlie the paradigm which will eventu-
ally prevail in the emergent era of nonterritorial
central guidance," 71 His reservations, however, do
not prevent his general endorsement of the New Haven
School's basic direction.7 2
67. Id. at 1009. For his earlier assessments of Mc-
Dougal, see R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
(1970).
68. Falk, supra note 57, at 1020.
69. Id. at 1011.
70. Id. at 993.
71. Id. at 1010, Falkts conception of the necesr
sary improvements in McDougal's work are grouped under the head-
ings of "values," "governments," "central guidance," and "trans-
ition strategy." Id. at 1012-1013. Falk interprets the World
Order Models Project in which he is active as an "unwitting at-
tempt to develop the New Haven approach so that it better satis-
fie[s] the needs for a global reform movement." Id. at 1013.
72. Id. at 1010. Falk also writes that "[i]t is as yet
unclear whether to regard McDougal (and collaborators) as the
immediate precursor of a new world order system, in the way that
we view Grotius today, or whether the role is a more antecedent
one, comparable to that of say, Vitoria or Suarez. Such a com-
parison will be more credible when made from the vantage point
of the 21st century." Id. at 1009.
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Yet it is difficult to understand from Falk's
accounting just what the Yale School's contri-
bution has been and why it might be said to offer
"paradigmatic" improvements over earlier conceptions
of international law. Falk's argument may please
those already persuaded of the importance of the policy-
oriented approach, but it does not fully explain what that
approach is about and where exactly it departs
from its predecessors.
B. The Problems with Paradigms
In fairness to Professor Falk, it must be noted
that his valuable Sherrill Lectures were only margin-
ally concerned with explaining the nature and signi-
ficance of the Lasswell-McDougal contribution--a task
he has undertaken elsewhere.73 But his larger argu-
ment about the need for further development of their
work is weakened by a forced adaptation of Kuhn's
1scientific revolution" argument to international law,
A preliminary question concerns the appropriate-
ness of fitting a model of intellectual development
derived from the history of natural science to a
field of study as dissimilar to physics and chemistry
as international law. It is highly problematic whether
the latter is a comparable "discipline" and whether ij
can be viewed in any sense as a "scientific" domain.7t
73. See R. FALK, supra note 67.
74. For a discussion of problems with the "cognitive
style" of social sciences generally, see Almond & Genco, Clouds,
Clocks, and the Study of Politics, 29 WORLD POL. 489 (1977);
Hirschman, The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understand-
ing, 22 WORLD POL. 329 (1970). But see Rogowski, International
Politics: The Past as Science, 12 INT'L STUD. A. 394 (1968).
McDougal himself has commented:
[F]rom the accounts of some of the con-
temporary historians of science, such as
that by Thomas S. Kuhn . . . it may be
doubted whether even the natural scien-
tists have ever enjoyed other than in
myth a conception of science so exclu-
sive and rigid as that sometimes propounded.
Subcomm. on Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 508, 514
(1967) (testimony of Myres McDougal).
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Even more serious questions can be raised con-
cerning Falk's failure to develop more thoroughly the
implications of his perspective for international law.
The progression of thought in law and social science
may be comparable in general structure to intellec-
tual developments in the natural sciences, but the
nature and substance of accepted knowledge is not
similar. Furthermore, the process by which "para-
digmatic" understandings become generally shared, the
degree of their acceptance, and the precision with
which they are articulated are different in the "non-
physical" sciences. These differences are important
to anyone making judgments as to the adequacy of one
paradigm or another. Thus if we are to take a
"Kuhnian" perspective on international legal studies,
such differences must be more carefully considered.
In politics and Jurisprudence, a paradigm or "set
of assumptions, traditions, and procedures" as Falk
means it, may function on two different levels. It
not only constitutes a common point of view about the
world, as in other fields, but may also affect that
world itself by inducing or enforcing changed behavior
on the part of the people it purports to describe.7 5
In other words, political or legal paradigms can be-
come self-fulfilling prophesies. Certain widely-held
assumptions become not merely descriptive of the world
of politics and law, but constitutive of that world
because they orient or reorient our response to it .76
Thus when a Hobbes or Machiavelli (or Hans
Morgenthau) describes politics as fundamentally a
struggle for power, he leads all those who find that
description credible to respond as though it were such
75. See Wolin, Paradigms and Political Theories, in POLI-
TICS AND EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS FOR MICHAEL OAKESHOTT 125 (P. King
& B. Parekh eds. 1968).
76. This might be called the equivalent of the "Heisen-
berg principle" in physics whereby the act of measurement affects
the phenomena being measured. See also A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT
OF INQUIRY 32 (1964) (discussion of related "double process of
interpretation"j; Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of In-
ternational Law, 11971] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 79, 117-18.
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a principle of human behavior. Unlike the natural
sciences, political theory and social science deal
with a subject matter (human behavior) which can be
expected to adjust in some degree to the generaliza-
tions made about it. As a consequence, the competi-
tion between different legal/political paradigms can
become a clash of values and symbols as much as a
debate about fact and perception.77 In such cases,
salesmanship and propaganda will play a large role in
the acceptance of one interpretation over another.
The work of Hugo Grotius illustrates this
dual character of legal "paradigms." By combining
certain generalizations about state practice with his
own normative interpretations, justified as "natural
law," Grotius wove a treatise about international
relations that exhorted and inspired as much as it
described, and thereby helped to bring the reality of
international behavior somewhat closer to his own
conceptions of how it should be. It became a standard
as well as a statement of international law which had
important influence upon succeeding generations.7 8
77. For Harold D. Lasswell's original discussion of his
"world revolution of our time" hypothesis, see Lasswell, The
World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy
Research, [1951], reprinted in WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES 29
(H. Lasswell & D. Lerner eds. 1965). See also H. LASSWELL &
A. KAPLAN, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL
INQUIRY 282-284 (1950).
Kuhn himself draws the analogy between political and
scientific revolutions in T. KUHN, supra note 57, at 92-94.
78. See H. MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1887); W.
SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND (1954); C. VON VOLLEN-
HOVEN, THE THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
(1919); Bull, The Grotian Conception of International Society,
in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS 51 (H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds.
1966); Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law.,
[19461 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
Of course, as far as Grotius and, other natural law ad-
herents are concerned, the distinction between "is" and "ought"
is faulty. To persons of this persuasion, moral principles are
derivable from "the nature of things." Professor Kuhn suggests
that even in the natural sciences "'[i]s' and 'ought' are by no
means always so separate as they have seemed." T. KUHN, supra
note 57, at 207. For discussions of the "Is-Ought" distinction
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This difference between law and the "hard" sci-
ences does not completely negate the value of look-
ing at international law in terms of paradigms. How-
ever, to say that Grotius' De Jure Belli et Pacis and
Newton's Mathematical Principles were both dominant
paradigms in their respective fields of thought is to
say something about intellectual paradigms in general,
but very little about either international law or
physics. If the notion is to be made useful for in-
ternational legal studies in anything but historical
discussion, we must break it down much further into
its particulars as they apply in this context. It
may be accurate to say, as does Professor Falk, that
international legal studies are at a "crisis" point
and in need of a "scientific revolution" in Kuhn's
sense, but to benefit from that insight we require a
better understanding than he provides of what such a
"revolution" might involve in this discipline at this
time. What does it mean to say that international law-
yers share a paradigm--"statist" or otherwise--and what
kinds of changes are involved in choosing one paradigm
over another?
C. Kuhn's Alternatives
Looking first to Professor Kuhn himself for
clarification, it becomes evident that his concept of
paradigms was not one of rigidly fixed content.79 In
acknowledging a certain variability in his original
usage, Kuhn subsequently suggested two basic meanings
of the term:
in modern political theory and the rise of "scientific value rela-
tivism," see A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY (1960); J. Hobbs, The
Rise of Scientific Value Relativism in American Political Science
(1961) (unpublished dissertation in Princeton University Library).
79. Masterman did a "content analysis" of Kuhn's use of
the term paradigm in his original essay and found three distinct
uses. See D. CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES 29 (1972) (citing Master-
man). He suggests that Kuhn generally uses it to mean "a problem-
solving device."
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On the one hand, it stands for the
entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on, shared by the
members of a given community. On the
other, it denotes one sort of element in
that constellation, the concrete puzzle
solutions which, employed as models or
exemplars, can replace explicit rules as
a basis for the solution of the remaining
puzzles of normal science.8 0
Both usages pose problems for researchers.
1. "Exemplars" of International Law
International law provides very few, if any,
instances of paradigms in the sense of "concrete puzzle
solutions," "models," or "exemplars" as Kuhn uses them
in reference to natural science. Despite what scholars
may have said about the achievements of Grotius, Vattel,
Kelsen or, for that matter, Myres McDougal, one can
hardly refer to individual works of international law
as solving the "puzzles" of international relations in
the same way that a Newton or an Einstein solved the
puzzles of physics. 1 There are, of course, certain
works whose acceptance and emulation are for a time so
pervasive that-they become classic illustrations of
"how to do" international law. Vattel's Law of Nations
was apparently one such work.82 But these amount really
to "approaches" or "standpoints" of a general and open-
ended variety rather than "jealous" paradigmsspurport-
ing to replace their predecessors completely,o5
80. T. KUHN, supra note 57, at 175.
81. On the successive breakthroughs in physics and their
radical implications for the discipline, see A. EINSTEIN & L.
INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS (1938).
82. See F. RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT
ch. 9 (1975).
83. The sociologist Daniel Bell, for example, refers to
paradigms as "conceptual schemes, which themselves are neither
models nor theories but standpoints from which models can he gener-
ated and theories developed." Bell, The Post-Industrial Society:
The Evolution of an Idea, in SURVEY 102, 158 (1971).
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Indeed, the notion of exclusivity is crucial to
Kuhn's scheme of paradigms and scientific revolutions,
A paradigm in physics, for example, is not merely an
approach to a subject matter or a problem, but an
"intolerant approach. "° 4 It admits of no competitors.
Differences in paradigms are irreconcilable differences
in perception and interpretation of reality. In fact,
so drastic is the transition from one such paradigm
to another that Kuhn likens the change to a "conver-
sion experience" or "gestalt switch." 5
It is precisely this aura of exclusivity and
intolerance that has prompted other scholars to dis-
sent from Falk's conclusion about the need for "a new
paradigm of international law." Professor James P.
Sewell, for one, compares the current situation in in-
ternational law to the post-World War II period in poli-
tical science generally, when many scholars became
committed to the so-called "behavioral revolution,"18 6
Sewell warns against preoccupation with the search for
a single "best" paradigm and asserts "the necessity of
serial contributions and joint cultivation rather than
the sufficiency of a single apocalyptic leap."87 Others
will surely fear the imposition of some new orthodoxy
in the name of a "scientific revolution."0 0 Indeed,
On the difference between "approaches" and theory, see 0,
YOUNG, SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Oh. 1 (1968).
84. Rogowski, supra note 74, at 397. See also T. KUHN,
supra note 57, at 109-110.
85. T. KUHN, supra note 57, at 204.
86. See Sewell, World Order Studies: A Critical Examina-
tion (July, 1974) (Research Monograph No. 43, Center of Interna-
tional Studies, Princeton University) [hereinafter cited as
Sewell, World Order Studies]. See also Sewell, Shapes of a World
to Come, 26 WORLD POL. 592 (1974).
87. Sewell, World Order Studies, supra note 86, at 33,
88. Philip Jessup warned against a similar tendency:
Perhaps it is some innate instinct for order-
liness which leads the human mind endlessly to
establish and to discuss classifications and
definitions and to evolve theories to justify
them. . . . The intellectual process is essen-
tial but it involves dangers. The more wedded
we become to a particular classification or
definition, the more our thinking tends to
become frozen and thus to have a rigidity which
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such suspicions of rigidity and intolerance may be
largely responsible for the resistance to Lasswell's
and McDougal's jurisprudence in some quarters. 89
Once again, this problem arises in part be-
cause of the double-sided quality of a paradigm-
candidate in law and politics. While in the natural
sciences the only value common to all endeavors is
ostensibly the search for truth, in jurisprudence
the choice of one paradigm or another often involves
a choice of certain other values as well: democracy,
egalitarianism, order, and so forth. To impose one
paradigm or world view is often to encourage an
orthodoxy of certain preferred outcomes, not just a
framework for scientific problem-solving. Thus, the
notion of a single paradigm of international law in
the sense of "exemplars" that set out the limits of
the discipline may seem to many people politically as
well as intellectually unacceptable.
However, even critics such as Professor Sewell
acknowledge the need for a certain minimal agreement
among international lawyers as to what they are
hampers progress toward the ever needed
new solutions of problems whether old or
new.
P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 7 (1956).
Similarly, Abraham Kaplan has warned of the "myth of metho-
dology":
the notion that the most serious
difficulties which confront behavioral
science are "methodological," and that
if only we hit upon the right methodology,
progress will be rapid and sure.
A. KAPLAN, supra note 76, at 24. See also Hirschman, note 74 supi
Singer, Cwnuativeness in the Social Sciences; Some Counter-
Prescriptions, P,S, 19 (Winter 1973); Wolin, note 75 anpra.
89. See, e.g., Farer, International Law and Political
Behavior: Toward a Conceptual Liaison, 25 WORLD POL. 430 (1973);
Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty
or Our "Interpretation" of It?, 65 AM, J. INT'L L. 358 (1971);
Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions
of Myres S. McDougal, 66 AM, J. INT'L L, 60 (1972).
70 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
about. 9 0 What is needed is something less rigid and
less exclusive than the "paradigm as exemplar" model,
but something which nonetheless affords a degree of in-
tellectual consensus sufficient to promote common effort.
2. A "Sociology" of International Law
Kuhn's first or "sociological" meaning of the term
"paradigm," defined as "the entire constellation of be-
liefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by the mem-
bers of a given community,"9 1 is more helpful in seeking
such a perspective. Although this is a residual, all-
inclusive concept, it nevertheless suggests the range of shar
assumptions that provide a necessary common foundation for an;
intellectual discipline. Falk's "statist paradigm" more
easily fits this loose definition, although the image of
a world of power-balancing nation-states is in fact only
one dimension of "the entire constellation" of assumptions
involved. 92
The sociological definition is preferable in this
context for several reasons. First, it is more inclusive
and forgoes the need to decide whether an approach is a full-
blown, jealous "paradigm" according to some standard of rigor
or originality. Second, it does not presuppose that
changes in basic approach involve relatively abrupt, "revo-
lutionary" transitions in which the old is rejected whole-
sale for the new. Finally, the "community" of persons in-
volved in the sociological approach is broad and inchoate,
and encompasses practicing lawyers and decision-makers as
well as scholars in various fields.
The attempt to give empirical precision to the
sociological conception of paradigms, however, presents a
serious problem of circularity. Analysis can begin
by identifying a particular "community" of international
jurists and then proceeding to examine the "constellationt of
ideas that they share in order to elaborate the common para-
digm; or, in the alternative, analysis can begin by speci-
fying a particular paradigmatic constellation and then
90. Sewell, World Order Studies, supra note 86, at 35. Sewell
refers to the problem of "scholarly disability because of inadequately
shared concepts and underdeveloped explanatory theory," Id,
91. T. KLHN, supra note 57, at 175.
92. See p, 76 infra,
[VOL. 4
1977] INTERNATIONAL LAW TO WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 71
proceeding to identify those who share that paradigm,
The problems in gathering adequate evidence for
either approach are formidable.
Professor Kuhn himself now emphasizes study of
the shared assumptions and dynamics of particular
scientific communities--or "invisible colleges," as
one historian of science has called them.9 3 Kuhn is
optimistic that precise techniques ^ or identifying
such communities can be developed;9  but in lieu of
such techniques he relies on an "intuitive notion of
community" to resolve the problem of circularity.9 5
Such a community includes all "the practitioners of
a scientific specialty."9 6  Clearly Falk's notion of
a community of "international legal studies" is in-
tuitive in this sense and would presumably include
all those persons, for example jurists, political
scientists, and government officials, who share the "sta-
tist" paradigm. This inclusivity is an indication
of the looseness with which Falk understands the con-
cept of paradigms as applied to international law.
Attempts might be made to delimit more precisely
particular schools or sub-schools within this all-
inclusive grouping. Surveys and correlations of "who
reads whom" and "who cites whom" have been used to
establish rough indices or rankings of influence and
thus to identify various intradisciplinary groupings?
7
93. D. CRANE, supra note 79 (building upon the work of
Derek de Solla Price). See also Schachter, The
Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. L,
REV. 217 (1977).
94. T. KUHN, supra note 57, at 175.
95. Id. at 176.
96. Id. at 177.
97. See, e.g., Outland, The Decision-Maker and the
Scholar: Who Reads Whom, 4 INT'L LAW. 859 (1970); Russett,
Methodological and Theoretical Schools in International Rela-
tions, in A DESIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH 87 (N.
Palmer ed. 1970). See also Finnegan & Giles, A Citation Analysis
of Patterns of Influence in International Relations Research,
2 INT'L STUD. NOTES 11 (Winter 1975).
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But neither index has been useful for satisfactory
articulation of the intellectual differences between
competing approaches or the reasons fgr their appeal
to some people and not to to others. 90 Nor do such
studies suggest standards for choosing among the
available approaches. Finally, such analyses can be
made only of the comparatively small academic portion
of the community.
Given this problem, an alternative approach is to
begin with a generalized notion of certain "communities"
of international lawyers--for example, along national
lines--and then proceed to compare the significant as-
sumptions made by each group about the discipline. An
especially enlightening study of this sort was done by
Professor Rosalyn Higgins. 99 She identified a very
basic difference between the pervasive "rule-orienta-
tion" of English international lawyers and the domi-
nant "process-orientation" of American international
lawyers.100 This distinction suggests an important
98. For a comprehensive survey of various approaches and
techniques in international law, see W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970). Of the McDougal-
Lasswell approach, Gould and Barkun write:
The best known and certainly the most pro-
ductive incorporation of a nonlegal approach
with the substance of international law has
been Myres S. McDougal's application of
Harold D. Lasswell's analytical framework.
Indeed, the Lasswell-McDougal collaboration,
joining political scientist and lawyer,
represents the teamwork over an extended
time span that Julius Stone held to be
essential to bring about marked advances in
international law.
Id. at 11.
99. Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International
Judicial Process, 17 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 58 (1968).
100. Id. at 60:
Our purpose is to draw attention to the fact
that the differences inherent in what we may
for convenience term the "American" and the
"British" views, now permeate the entire
fabric of international law. . .
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difference in perspective among international lawyers
which is influenced by differences in educational
background. However, some commentators have cast doubts
on the accuracy or adequacy of this particular differen-
tiation.10 1
Efforts to distinguish other national perspec-
tives have appeared from time to time. 1 0 2 What is still
needed in such efforts, however, is a basic accounting
of the full range of assumptions involved. These assump-
tions would be described by Professor Falk as a "para-
digm" of international law, but may be more accurately
described as an "approach" or "orientation." The di-
mensions of the problem are considerably more varied
than he seems to suggest, and the degree of consensus
on all of them considerably less complete. Nonetheless,
the possibilities for clarification and improvement of
international legal studies at this level remain sub-
stantial. More useful than Kuhn, in this context, are
studies of the social sciences and, in particular,
sociology.
[T]here is all too little analysis in
terms of the underlying perceptions of the
nature of international law.
The distinction between "rule-oriented" and "process-oriented"
approaches is illustrated as follows:
The great majority of British international
lawyers regard international law as a set
of neutral rules, which it is the task of
the judge to apply objectively to the facts
before him. . . It is, however, possible
to perceive international law in a funda-
mentally different way--as a particular,
specialized decision-making process.
Id. at 58.
101. See 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., Supp. II, at 111
(1972) (remarks of Eli Lauterpacht).
102. See, e.g., CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (R. MACDONALD, G. MORRIS & D. JOHNSTON eds.
1974); W. HOLDER & G. BRENNAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
(1972); J. RSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1972); S. JAYAKUMAR, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES FROM MALAYSIA
AND SINGAPORE (1974); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (But-
ler trans. 1974); McDougal, note 32 supra.
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D. Gouldner's "Domain Assumptions"
Alvin Gouldner begins his study1 0 3 of Western
(and largely American) sociology by emphasizing that
the crucial assumptions of any sociologist are those
underlying generalities about the world which seldom,
if ever, receive conscious examination. In addition
to the set of "explicitly formulated assumptions" or
"postulations" which form the outline of any care-
fully-developed social theory, there is "a second set
of assumptions that are unpostulated and unlabeled"
that he calls "background assumptions."1 0  These
background assumptions range in generality from meta-
physical beliefs ("world hypotheses") that are appli-
cable to every dimension of life, to more specific
assumptions that relate to knowledge within a given
field of inquiry, such as sociology or international
law. Within these more specific "domains" of know-
ledge, "domain assumptions" determine the general
orientation of an observer, that is, how he performs
all other theoretical and empirical tasks.105
Gouldner offers the following example of the
kinds of assumptions that might or might not be made
about sociology: "that men are rational or irrational,
that society is precarious or fundamentally stable;
that social problems will correct themselves without
planned intervention; that human behavior is unpre-
dictable; that man's true humanity resides in his
feelings and sentiments. "10 6
Maintenance of such presuppositions is seldom an
entirely rational process. These assumptions grow
out of one's lifelong experience and, as Gouldner puts
it, "are often internalized in us long before the in-
tellectual age of consent."107
103. A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY
(1970).
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id. at 31.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 32.
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Gouldner also suggests that the explicit theories
that are acceptable to practitioners in a given dis-
cipline during any period depend on the "fit" of
those theories with the domain assumptions of the period)lC
The appeal of a theory or interpretation is determined
as much by its compatibility with these frequently un-
examined generalities as it is by its "validity" or
"utility" in relation to the facts or problems under
scrutiny. 1 0 9 In short, Gouldner sets the stage for
an extensive "sociology of sociology" that considers
the fate of certain theoretical approaches in American
sociology according to the changing intellectual and
cultural setting of American society)-1 0
This general perspective provides a valuable
approach to the understanding of international law
as an intellectual discipline. Professor Falk's ef-
forts to develop a single dominant "paradigm of in-
ternational legal studies" may be translated into an
effort to reexamine the various "domain assumptions"
that underlie our understanding of international law
and to consider alternatives in light of the political
circumstances and requirements of our time. The basic
objective of intellectual reform remains the same, but
the nature of the task and the expectation of "revo-
lutionary breakthrough" to a fundamentally different
paradigm need revision.1 1 1
The difficulty in such an approach is in iden-
tifying those fundamental issues of international le-
gal studies about which the crucial "domain assump-
tions" are made. Here the work of Lasswell and Mc-
108. For speculation on the master ideas of an his-
torical era, see M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEO-
LOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1970).
109. See A. KAPLAN, supra note 76, at 86.
110. A. GOULDNER, supra note 103, at 25.
111. These intellectual differences may also reflect an
analogous difference in our respective political expectations about
the prospects for change. A notion of "revolutionary break-
throughs" has been contrasted with more gradualist approaches to
the theory of political "modernization" in K. JOWITT, REVOLUTIONARY
BREAKTHROUGHS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF ROMANIA, 1945-
1965 (1971).
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Dougal has made a considerable contribution. More
than any other school of thought, it has
directed attention to underlying assump-
tions about law. Unless such issues themselves are
recognized, therefore, the justification for their
approach will probably be found lacking.
E. Criteria for a Theory About International Law:
The Who, What, How, and Why Issues
In numerous writings on jurisprudence during
the past decade, Lasswell and McDougal have organized
their analysis around four basic "emphases" or "cri-
teria" for an adequate "theory about law", as dis-
tinguished from particular theories of law.1 1 2
Especially relevant here is a 1968 article with
Michael Reismanll3 . Anyone familiar with their work
will recognize the following headings from that
article:
112. See, e.g., Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a
Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); Lasswell &
McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U.
FLA. L. REV. 486 (1967).
The distinction between theories of law and theories
about law is drawn by McDougal in SoMe Basic Theoretical Con-
cepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework
of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RES. 337 (1960). McDougal takes it
from Thurman Arnold (who attributed the distinction to his col-
league, Edward S. Robinson):
This spiritual trouble would be avoided if
the scholar realized that there is a need
for both a science of law and a science
about law--the one for ceremonial use in-
side the institution and the other for
observation from above.
Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers--A Reply to Dean
Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 811, 813 (1936). See also Robinson,
Psychology and the Law, 1 J. SOC. PHIL. 197 (1936).
113. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
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1. Establishment of observational standpoint;
2. Delimitation of the focus of inquiry;
3. Performance of intellectual tasks;
4. Postulation of basic goals.
These four categories amount to a breakdown of the
kinds of basic issues involved in discussing the
"domain assumptions" of international legal studies
and their current inadequacies. Though never refer-
red to as such, they can be called the who, what,
how dnd why assumptions of the international legal
domain,114
1. WHO? Assumptions about Observational
Standpoint
The most general domain assumptions of inter-
national lawyers relate to matters of personal identi-
fication, expectation, and aspiration -- all of which
may be characterized as issues of "standpoint" or
"point-of-view."ll5 Despite their primacy in deter-
mining what it is that international lawyers and
jurists do and how and why they do it, these assumptions
are probably the least subject to scrutiny.
114. William L. Morison characterizes the observa-
tional standpoint issue as "The 'Where Am I?' Question," and
the focus of inquiry issue as "The 'What Fields Shall I
Conquer?' Question". See Morison, Myres S. McDougal and
Twentieth-Century Jurisprudence: A Comparative Essay, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 3 (M. Reisman & B. Weston
eds. 1976).
The classic usage, of course, was in H. LASSWELL,
POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936).
115. I am grateful to Professor William Twining for
suggestions on the standpoint issue, though our approaches
remain somewhat different. See Twining, The Bad Man Re-
visited, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (1973); Twining, Some Jobs
for Jurisprudence, 1 BRIT. J. L. & SOC. 149 (1974). See also
W. TWINING & D. MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES 24-33 (1976);
Moline, On Points of View, 5 AMER. PHIL. Q. 191 (1968). For
a general outline of the range of assumptions see the dis-
cussion in Lasswell, supra note 77, at 64-77.
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The importance of such assumptions in influ-
encing the thinking and performance of international
lawyers should be evident. Cultural and national
identifications affect decisions about the nature
and scope of international society, the kinds of
sources and information that should be consulted,
and the interests that are served by an internation-
al legal system.11 6 Restrictive identifications
with a single culture, class, or nation-state may
have significant impact on one's interpretation and
performance .117
Similarly, assumptions about the appropriate
role of an international legal scholar become cru-
cial determinants. McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman
have emphasized the basic distinction between
"'scholarly observer" and "active decision-maker,' 1 1 8
but the full range of important standpoints is much
broader.1 1 9 Officials may be motivated principally
by a desire to maintain the social and political
status quo against all challenges, or they may have
aspirations as radical innovators. Advocates may
place all other considerations behind the interests
of their clients, or they may be reformers at heart
whose overriding objective is to change the system
as a whole. Even "scholarly observers" exhibit a
wide range of standpoints, from principal concern
with developing a "science" of international law for
116. Lasswell, Future Systems of Identity in the World
Cormunity, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (C.
Black & R. Falk eds. 1972). See also A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE
OF LAIW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD (1971); H. Hernes, Concepts
of Community in Modern Theories of International Law (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1970).
117. One of the few examples of such an accusation in
print was Tom J. Farer's dig at John Norton Moore as "a white
scholar, reared in the cocky middle classes of an affluent and
relatively open society," in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 554 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
118. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 113, at
199.
119. See Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, supra note
115, at 285-289. Twining's reference to "criteria of rele-
vance" is especially enlightening. I agree with Professor
Twining that Lasswell and McDougal have tended to oversimpli-
fy this issue.
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its own sake to an assumed inadequacy of the present
international system and a search for a successor.
Attitudes toward the subject and receptivity to dif-
ferent approaches will necessarily grow out of an
individual's presuppositions. However, one's choice
of personal standpoint is not determined independent-
ly of other assumptions about international studies,
i.e., what, how, and why. In fact, only by confront-
ing these other choices do the implications of one
standpoint or another become clear.
A classic example of a dichotomy in standpoint
among international lawyers is that between the
"Grotian" (or "universalist," "monist," "solidarist")
conception of international law, and one that is
variously labeled "Vattelian," "pluralist," or "posi-
tivist."1 2 0 While a considerable amount of over-
simplification accompanies these designations, the
issues that distinguish one from the other illustrate
important differences in standpoint.
Grotius and his juridical heirs emphasized the
broadest identifications for international lawyers.
Their influence has been in the direction of univer-
salizing the application of legal considerations to
cultures, nations, and substantive issues. Thus,
Grotius rejected the exclusion of non-Christians
from the international legal system, resisted the
double standard of raison d' tat as an excuse for in-
ternational delinquency, and rejected the notion that
legal considerations should not apply to matters of
"vital" state interest. 1 2 1
"Grotians" generally base such views on the
perceived implications of interdependence within the
world community and the solidarity or common interest
that necessarily results. They tend to analogize
readily between municipal law and the law
of nations. Ultimately, such perspectives derive
from a faith in the power of reason to manage inter-
120. Bull, supra note 78, at 52; Falk, supra note 57,
at 977 n.17; W. SCHIFFER, supra note 78.
121. Lauterpacht, supra note 78.
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national problems and gradually to improve the en-
tire system according to self-evident conceptions
of morality and justice.1 2 2
In contrast to the Grotians, the "pluralists"
see universalism as so much wishful thinking. They
deemphasize solidarity, limit applicability of law,
and emphasize the disparities and differences that
divide nations and restrain their common interests.1 2 3
Predictably, "pluralists" emphasize the differences
between national and international law and the consen
quent differences in standards applicable to each.
Unlike the Grotians, the "pluralists" have a more
pessimistic attitude toward the prospects for sub-
stantial international reform of the state system and
hold lower expectations for the beneficent interven-
tion of reason and morality in world politics. They
therefore minimize the role of international lawyers
as agents of progress.1 2 4
Assumptions of this sort are among the most
susceptible to changes in intellectual attitudes.
Grotius' seventeenth century optimism could not with-
stand the far more restrained positivism of Vattel
which largely dominated the succeeding three cen-
turies.1 2 5 The return to the Grotian conception, as
Hedley Bull suggests, came only with the impact of two
World Wars.126
Since complete consensus on matters so closely
related to personal intuition as the "who" questions
of jurisprudence is difficult to reach, rational
resolution of the issues suggested by the universa-
list/pluralist dichotomy is not fully possible. This
fact suggests the enormous variety of possible per-
spectives or dimensions of "observational standpoint"
from which international law is approached.1 2 7 But
this variety also indicates the critical choices
that are involved in establishing one's orientation
122. Id.
123. Bull, supra note 78.
124. Id. at 69-73.
125. See F. RUDDY, supra note 82.
126. Bull, supra note 78.
127. See, e,g.j W, GOULD & M. BARKUN, supra note 98,
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to the subject. These choices are often made incon-
sistently, without deliberation or without a clear
conception of what one is trying to accomplish. In
the face of the enormous changes occurring in the
international system, the current "crisis" of inter-
national legal studies is in large measure an "iden-
tity crisis" of international lawyers who are not
sure of "who" they are. Not knowing the who, it
becomes difficult to decide rationally the remaining
issues: what to study, how to do it, and why.
2. WHAT? Assumptions about the Focus of
Inquiry
The most familiar issues in international legal
studies are those related to the nature and scope of
the subject matter. What is law? Where do we look
for evidence of it? What are the major features of
the system in which it operates? With what kinds of
problems does it deal?1 2 0 In spite of the familiarity
of these matters, they are not easily treated or
resolved. The "what" questions of jurisprudence are
nonetheless routine, and almost every text or treatise
on international law begins with a designation of the
primary focus, for example, that "[i]nternational law is a
body of rules and principles of action which are
binding upon civilized states in their relations with
one another."1 2 9
Traditionally, as the definition implies, inter-
national lawyers have focused upon institutions deemed
to be inherently "legal" in nature, for example, courts,
treaty documents, and official pronouncements, with some
effort to generalize about state practice on matters
not otherwise expressed in formal legal terms. For
128. See Coplin, International Law and Assump-
tions About the State System, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 142 (J. Rosenau ed. 1969).
129. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (6th ed. 1963).
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the most part, the products of these institutions
and activities were assumed to he embodied in, or
translatable to, rules of law that provided the
basis for future guidance on legal issues. The test
of what actually could be called "law" in these
settings was sometimes so narrow as virtually to de-
fine away the subject altogether.1 3 0
During the last century, more expansive points
of view have developed, including those often re-
ferred to as "sociological" theories of international
law. To jurists in this frame of mind, international
law is seen as a working part of the larger system
of international relations. The rules themselves are
but one component of larger processes that must be
considered. The focus is thereby explicitly extended
to various "non-legal" dimensions of the international
milieu.1 3 1
In either case, the range of phenomena that could
be subsumed within an international lawyer's focus of
inquiry is vast. Yet the criteria of selection are
rarely fully explained. Among the elements1 32 that a
lawyer may take into account are "participants" (for
example, states, individuals, corporations and
organizations, economic and regional blocs, and inter-
national organizations); the various claims of parti-
cipants, relating to nationality, resources, and
institutions; the context in which these claims arise,
including geographic areas and historical periods;133
and numerous other factors.
130. K. THOMPSON, POLITICAL REALISM AND THE CRISIS OF
WORLD POLITICS C1960); McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L.
102 (1952); Williams, International Law and the Controversy Con-
cerning the Word "Law", 1945 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146t
131 See Coplin, Current Studies of the Functions of Inter-
national Law: Assessments and Suggestions, [1971] POL. SCI. ANN.
149, 157-161; Hernes, supra note 116.
132. This breakdown is based on the "phase analysis"
categories developed by the "Yale School", with certain modi-
fications of terminology. See Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence
in Policy-Oriented Perspective, supra note 112.
133. See Higgins, Integrations of Authority and Control:
Trends- n the Literature of International Law and International
Relations, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 114,
at 79.
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Conventional treatments of international law gve
special consideration only to certain features of this
vast context. For example, states are not only the
primary actors in the international legal system, but
they have also traditionally been the only partici-
pants whose claims are acknowledged under international
law. Claims made by individuals are recognized only
through official adoption by a state.134 Similarly,
vast areas of the globe and entire eras of history
have generally been ignored in presenting evidence
of state practice or precedent. Even in the modern
era of elaborate "case reporter" systems, the selection
of relevant precedents and the reporting of significant
facts is far from comprehensive.
In both cases, justifications might be given for
the choice of focus; the point is that each implies a
certain frame of attention which may or may not be
related to rational criteria of selection.135 What
international lawyers study is often taken for granted
rather than related to conscious objectives or based on
a comprehensive map of the terrain.
3. HOW? Assumptions about Intellectual Tasks
International lawyers have long insisted on the
distinction between the law as it is (lex lata) and the
law as it ought to be (de lege ferenda).13 6 Studies or
assertions about either have been considered legitimate
exercises as long as the two are rigorously distinguished.
In practice, of course, the distinction is a difficult
one to preserve.137 Furthermore, this dichotomy hardly
dges justice to the range of operations which are per-
f-ormed by international lawyers, whether identified
individually or not.
134. For Philip Jessup's famous critique, see P. JESSUP,
A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION (1948). See also
Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law,
46 AM. J. INT'L L. 428 (1952).
135. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 113, at
202-204.
136. For a typical formulation, see H. KELSEN, THE PURE
THEORY OF LAW 5-6 (Knight trans. 1967).
137. Writers of treatises or restatements invariably
must make judgments about which is "the better rule" even if only
to maintain consistency in generalizations where disagreement is
otherwise evident. Efforts to maintain the distinction between
the "codification" and "progressive development" of international
law face similar problems. See McDougal, International Law, Power,
and Policy, supra note 43, at 156.
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The duties of lawyers have been usefully
analyzed by McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman.l3 Lawyers
perform a normative task (goal clarification) that in-
cludes specification, elaboration, and justification of
goals and the suggestion of priorities. Another task is
the historical description of past trands, including the
formulation of criteria for their evaluation, identifica-
tion, and generalization of their important features, and
organization and presentation of the information thus
obtained. The scientific task includes the identifica-
tion of recurring factors, hypotheses about causal or
influential relationships, and a melding of these into
explanations of past behavior. The suggestion of probable
future developments is yet another function performed by
international lawyers: projecting likely conditions and
identifying contingencies and their probably effects.
Finally, their creative contribution is to develop alter-
native policies, including the identification of departures
from goals in light of the projections made, the formu-
lation of general strategies for achievement of those
goals, and a recommendation of specific policies for
achievement of those goals. Taking the roles of advocacy,
scholarship, or prophecy seriously amounts to engaging in
a range of intellectual operations directed at the past
and future behavior of decisionmakers. Merely purporting
to say "what the law is" involves several distinct steps
in research and reasoning: historical, analytical, and
speculative. The exhaustiveness with which each step is
undertaken should depend upon the importance to the
observer of being correct about the outcomes; but the steps
are theoretically present in any case.139
138. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 113, at
204-206.
139. McDougal and Lasswell refer in this regard to the need
for a "principle of economy":
We are calling attention here to the obvious
necessity of recognizing limits on deliberation,
and proposing that the decision-maker face these
choices candidly as he goes along. The various
specific operations by which new information is
made available vary greatly in money cost; hence one
of the ever-present features of judgment is whether
relatively high costs will add much to the context that
will legitimately affect one's final judgment.
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 66 (1967).
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Similarly, lawyers acting in an official capa-
city, as well as those who wish to influence official
decisions, necessarily pass through the normative and
creative stages as well as the others, even if these
are not always rationally confronted. Avoidance of
rational consideration or personal responsibility
does not suspend the act of choosing goals or policies,
but merely foregoes the opportunity for rational choice
and influence.
4. WHY? Assumptions about Basic Goals
The final set of domain assumptions relates
to the ends of the entire exercise. Once again, the
nature of prior standpoint is the crucial determinant.
The aspirations and expectations of international law-
yers as individuals normally lead to certain general
assumptions about the concrete results that interna-
tional legal studies are supposed to promote. These
in turn will condition other assumptions.
In general, impacts might be sought in one or
a combination of three realms: the intellectual/aca-
demic community, the political/decision process, and
the larger world society. In each case, the basic
goals may also be distinguished according to when they
are expected to be realized.1 0
With respect to the first of these realms, -con-
crete objectives may include an improved theory of inter-
national law, better communication among scholars, or
better communication between teachers and students. In
the "power process," results could include a better theor
of international law with respect to particular issues,
increased communication between scholars, practitioners,
and decisionmakers, or improved decisionmaking.
Finally, from the standpoint of political, economic,
and social factors (World Public Order), one might seek t.
promote greater stability in international relations
(minimum order), greater efficiency in international
140. On the matter of academic impacts, see Young, The
Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of InternationaZ
Relations, in THEORY AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (R.
Tanter & R. Ullmann eds. 1972).
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relations, a strengthening of the political status quo, c
improved popular understanding of international re-
lations.
The distinction between the short and long
term may be decisive with respect to the approaches
taken. For example, if the basic objective is to
influence decisionmakers on current problems, the
demands of long-term theory-building, such as con-
ceptual clarification and standardization,141 may
seem prohibitively cumbersome and ineffectual. On
the other hand, if one is concerned with radical
changes in the structure of world politics, conven-
tional studies of "what the law is" on various
issues may seem pointless.1 4 2
F. Reconstructing Internationat Law
The previous enumeration of basic issues is
obviously only a tentative effort to raise the under-
lying "domain assumptions" of international legal
studies to the level of rational consideration. The
purpose of such an exercise is not to suggest that
there are any inherently correct assumptions upon
which to build a jurisprudence of international law
adequate to the times. On the contrary, the criteria
of selection will vary considerably depending upon
the point-of-view of individual observers.
But it should also be evident at this point
that the choices made about what, how and why may
not always be rationally related to the standpoint
and objectives of the observer, even where that stand-
point is deliberately chosen. There is a widespread
tendency to leave these issues unexplored and to
accept uncritically the intellectual inheritance of
previous eras. Not only is it questionable whether
those earlier assumptions remain adequate for the
world at present, but they have often been imprecise,
inconsistent, and incomplete in themselves.
141. Lasswell has suggested that the significant impacts
of theory-building efforts can be expected only several decades
,later.
142. See R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975); S.
NENDLOVITZ, ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED
WORLDS FOR THE 1990'S (1975).
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Professor Falk writes of a crisis in inter-
national legal studies and calls for a collective
effort to refashion a new "Juridical paradigm."143
It is doubtful that such a paradigm will ever emerge
or even that it is desirable to think in terms of
such wholesale substitutions of one grand approach
for another.144 But there is some value in Falk's
evaluation of traditional approaches in light of the
problem of managing and changing the world as we
find it today. It seems imperative that those concerned
with international law begin to reexamine their basic
assumptions in light of both the intellectual and
political changes of recent times, and to debate
their way to some limited form of consensus or common
understanding.
McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman have set down
in general terms their "criteria for an adequate
theory about law.I'l 5  This is a fundamental contri-
bution. They have also recommended their own general
approach to each one of the issues frequently hidden
within the underlying assumptions about the interna-
tional legal domain. I have tried to explore these
recommendations in greater detail elsewhere. 1 4 6 On
the basis of such an examination, I would not suggest
that the work of the "Yale School" in any way
"solves" the problems of international legal studies,
143. Falk, supra note 57.
144. I am not as pessimistic, however, as Young, supra
note 89, nor do I agree with Leon Lipson's admonition to inter-
national lawyers that "in a world of ideological confrontation
and nuclear suspense international lawyers might do well to
curb their zeal, contract their horizons, and Think Small."
Lipson, Inteknational Law,in 8 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 415, 434 (1975).
145. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 113.
146. F. Tipson, Consolidating World Public Order: The
-American Study of International Law and the Work of Harold D.
Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, 1906-1976 (May, 1977) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
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or even that it entirely lives up to its own stan-
dards of adequacy; but I do believe that the Lass-
well-McDougal-Reisman formulation of the issues is
immensely valuable in itself, and that its recom-
mendations for improvement are generally in the
right direction. In seeking changes in interna-
tional legal studies, however, the purpose must not
be to enthrone some new orthodox approach to the
subject, whether "policy-oriented" or some other,
but to "ask ourselves," with Dean Pound, "what are
likely to be the elements of a new theory of Inter-
national Law and whence a more adequate Interna-
tional Law is to derive its materials." I would
suggest with Lasswell and McDougal that we do well
to begin with the basics and to reexamine our in-
tellectual assumptions about international law with
great care.
